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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of earnings taxes on the variability
of wages over time. We estimate a "hedonic wage locus" which indicates
how the market allows individuals to substitute the mean level of the
wage for its variability across jobs. Information from this locus is
used to estimate the parameters of individuals' indifference curves
between the mean and temporal variation of hourly wages. On the basis
of these utility function parameters, we predict that lowering the rate
of taxation on earnings would on average lead workers to choose jobs
with a higher pre—tax mean wage and with greater wage variation.






According to standard theoretical considerations, a worker chooses
that job (among those feasible) whose characteristics maximize his
utility. In the process, the worker equates his marginal rate of
substitution between any two job attributes with the marginal rate of
transformation between them. As the individual's economic environment
changes, so too may these marginal rates of substitution and transfor-
mation, leading to a change in the characteristics of the worker's opti-
mal job package. In particular, one might well expect the worker's tax
situation to affect his choice.
In this paper, we examine the effect of earnings taxes on one
important job attribute, the variability of wages over time. In our
model, we assume that each job can be characterized by the mean and
variance of hourly wages over time. These are calculated using longi-
tudinal data, and the results used to estimate a "hedonic wage locu"
which indicates how the market allows individuals to substitute the
mean level of the wage with its variability across jobs. We use the
information obtained from this locus to estimate the parameters of
individuals' indifference curves between the mean and temporal variation
of hourly wages. Given these utility function parameters, we thenpre—
dict how individuals' job choices would change in response to alter—
native proportional rates of taxation on earned income. The results
indicate that lowering the rate of taxation on earnings would onaverage
lead workers to choose jobs with a higher pre—tax mean wage and with
greater wage variation.—2—
In Section II, we model an individual worker's choice of wage
variability and demonstrate that wage variability mayincreaseor
decrease utility. To the extent wage variability Is foreseen and the
worker is able to increase his labor supply in high wage years,
variability is desirable. On the other hand, to the extent wage
variability is not foreseen and the worker is risk averse, it is
undesirable. Ourdiscussionformalizes this distinction and shows
its Implications.
In section III we adopt specific functional forms so that the
theory can be used as the basis for empirical analysis, which follows
in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper with some suggestions for
future research.
II. Theoretical Considerations
Each worker chooses a job that is characterized by a particular
combination of mean and temporal variation In the hourly wage. In this
section, we begin by considering the worker's preferences for mean and
variation in hourly wages. We then consider, in turn, the worker's
opportunity set for the choice of a job and the optimal job choice.
A. The Worker's Preferences for Mean and Variation in Hourly Wages
Consider an individual at the beginning of his working life
who, having accumulated some given level of education, is choosing from
a set of alternative lifetime jobs. At each job, the derived demand—3—
schedule for the worker's services will generally embody some variation,
due to variation in the supply of complementary and substitutable fac—
tors of production or in the demand for final products. As a result,
the hourly wages paid on each job, although perhaps constant over some
intervals (e.g., within years) will generally vary across intervals
(e.g., across years). Some of this variation may be foreseen by the
worker but, in general, some portion of this variation will not be
foreseen.
Wage variation that is not foreseen by the worker complicates the
worker's interteinporal allocation of the lifetime wealth offered by any
job and may reduce the worker's realized lifetime utility. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that the worker can benefit from the opportunities
for substitution created by variable wages, exposure to wage variation
may still be considered a good, even though some or all of that
variation may be unpredictable to the worker. Whether the worker pre-
fers or dislikes exposure to wage variation will depend on two things:
first, the degree to which that variation can be predicted and second,
the worker's tastes ——in particular, the overall concavity of the
worker's utility function and the substitutability between the various
arguments of that function.
To illustrate these points, consider a worker whose lifetime
utility function is given by
(1) U(C1, L1, C2, L2, •..,C,LN)
where N denotes the length of the individual's working life,C—4—
denotes consumption of market goods in period i, L denotes the pro-
portion of the time endowment devoted to leisure in period i, and
where U(s) is assumed to be an everywhere Continuous, twice differen-
tiable, strictly concave function. Assume that the worker can borrow
and lend freely at a constant rate of interest, but is constrained to
have zero net assets at the end of his working life. Ignoring taxes,
the worker's budget constraint is given by
N
(2) A + [w.(1—L) —C}(1+r)1=0
1=1 --
whereA denotes the initial level of assets,w denotes the hourly
wage in period 1, and r is the rate of interest. Assume also that
the wage in period i is given by
(3) w. =i ++ v
where c1 denotes a zero—mean, non—stochastic component of the period—
I wage which Is foreseen by the worker prior to job choice; and v1 denotes
a zero—mean component of the period—i wage which is stochastic to the
worker prior to job choice, but which becomes fully known to the worker
immediately after job choice.' We define:
'For example, c might represent an anticipated trend component of
earnings attriutable to seniority—related compensation, while
might represent unanticipated job— or employer—specific factors
revealed to the worker only after the worker's job choice has been
made.— 5—
(4) Var (c1) = forall I
2
Var (v1) = forall I
Coy (c., c) =
Coy(v1, v.) =
Coy(c1, v) =0for all 1, j.
Given these assumptions, the actual wage sequence to be realized by the
worker is uncertain prior to job choice, but becomes fully known by the
worker immediately after job choice. Thus, the criterion on which the
worker's job choice In period zero rests is
(5) E0V(w1, ...,WN;A,r)
where V(.) denotes the indirect utility function associated with
equation (1). In this expression, the expectation is taken over the
"period zero' distribution of wages in all future periods.
Taking a second—order expansion about the point (p, ...,u; A,r),
expression (5) can be restated as
(6) E0V(W1, ...,WN;A,r)
V(ii, ...,i; A,r)+4E0 (w1—iixw-i.i).
Applying Roy's identity, expression (6) can be simplified to— 6—
(7) E0V(w1, ..., A,r)
N N
i;A,r)+4X(.) (1+r)'S1.() p1.




where X(.) denotes the marginal expected utility of wealth in period
zero', S denotes the Slutsky—compensated derivative of time worked
in period I with respect to the wage in period j,andwhere all func-
tions are evaluated at the point (it,..., p;A,r).
As is evident from expression (7), the expected level of lifetime
utility associated with any particular job depends (approximately) on
two basic things: The mean level of wages realized over the worker's
lifetime and the variance—covariance structure of those wages. To a
second—order approximation, a higher mean level of wages, ceteris pan—
bus, increases the first term on the right hand side of (7) without
altering the other terms, so it clearly Increases utility. The effect
of the variance—covariance structure of wages is less clear, however.
One fundamental determinant of this effect, shown in the second
and third terms on the right hand side of (7), is the substitutability
(as measured by the S1 )betweenthe various arguments of the worker's
utility function. Ceteris paribus, an Increase in the covariance of—7—
wages in period i and jincreases expected utility If leisure in
periods I and jare substitutes, and decreases expected utility If
leisure in periods I and j are complements. Also, the morerespon-
sive is the demand for leisure In any period i to the wage in period
i, the more positive is the effect of wage variance on expected
utility.2
The second fundamental determinant of the effect of wage variation
on expected utility Is evident In the last terra on the right hand side
of (7). This term reflects the effect on expected utility of the
worker's ex ante uncertainty regarding lifetime wealth.3 Theassump-
tion of perfect foresight immediately after job choice guarantees that
the uncertainty of wages prior to job choice has no effect on the
worker's ultimate consumption and labor supply behavior. It therefore
guarantees that this uncertainty will have no effect on the lifetime
utility realized by the worker, conditional on any given hourly wage
sequence. Nevertheless, as long as A is diminishing in wealth, the
unconditional period "zero" expected lifetime utility for the worker
generally Is reduced by this uncertainty. Only in the case where the
worker's marginal utility of wealth Is constant =0)Is this
effect absent.
It is natural to measure the strength of the worker's "taste' for
2Strict concavity of the worker's utility function Implies that the
Sjj matrix In (5) is positive semi—definite, and thus that the
second and third terms on the right hand side of (6) are positive.
3 N N
The term (1+rY1(1—Lj(•))(1—L1(.)i1ja, is equal to the
1=1 j=1
period "zero" variance of realized lifetime wealth.—8—
wagevariation by the marginal change in the mean value of hourly wages
that would just compensate the worker for a marginal increase in the
variation of hourly wages about their mean value. Assuming for siinpli—
city that £andv are uncorrelated over time, differentiation
of expression (7) with respect to .i,a2,and shows that
the compensating differential asssociated with fully foreseen wage






dE0V(.) =0 (1+r) [l—L.(.)]
1=1
1
whilethe compensating differential associated with intially unforeseen
wage variation Is
(l+r) {s1 i3X(.) [1—L(.)]2]
(8b) 1 i=l A A




From these expressions, we can make two observations.
First, from expression (8a), It can be seen that the worker unam-
biguously prefers wage variation which can be foreseen to the absence of
such variation. Wreover, the greater the worker's ability to respond
to variable wages (more precisely, the larger the S1 ),thegreater—9—
will be the worker's preference for such wage variation. Second, expres-
sion (8b) indicates that the worker may either prefer or dislike wage
variation that is initially unforeseen. As with foreseeable wage
variation, the worker's preference for initially unforeseen wage
variation Is more positive, the greater the worker's ability to substi-
tute leisure across periods. Unlike the case of foreseeable wage
variation, however, the uncertainty regarding realized wealth that is
implied by initially unforeseen wage variation introduces an additional,
negative effect on the worker's expected utility. This effect is more
negative, the greater the overall concavity of the workers utility func-
tion (or more precisely, the more negative the value of Without
further restrictions on the worker's utility function, therefore,
expression (8b) cannot be signed.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that our empirical
focus in this paper is on wage "variation" rather than wage "uncertainty".
We cannot observe directly the indicators of wage uncertainty that are
relevant to individuals. We see only ex post wage variation, some com-
ponent of which may have been forseen by the worker. Given this fact,
any empirical analysis of workers' responses to wage uncertainty must
rest on some prior assumption linking ex post wage variation to ex ante
wage uncertainty.4 Rather than employ such an assumption, we choose
Instead to focus simply on wage variation.
4For some examples, see Weiss [1972], Abowd and Ashenfelter[1980],
and Johnson [1980].—10—
In the absence of further information regarding worker's prefer-
ences and regarding the exact distinction between foreseen and unfore-
seen variation for each individual, the most we can say is that the
worker will be more likely to prefer wage variation, the more fore-
seeable that variation is, and the greater the worker's intertemporal
substitutability of leisure. The more rapidly diminishing the worker's
marginal utility of wealth, the more likely it is that the worker will
be observed to require a positive wage premium for exposure to wage
variation.
More explicitly, if we define a as the variance of the wage,
then on the assumption that
=aa2 V C
the assumption that s and v are uncorrelated implies that
2 (l\2 a =
C l+c w
and
a2 =(——-)a2 v l+c* w
Consequently, expressed in terms of the observable a2 rather than the
unobservable components a2 and a ,expression(7) becomes—11—
(9) EV (w1, w2, ...,w1A,r)
p; A,r) +4X(.) (l+rYs1 {()Pjj +
+4 (l+r)
(l_L1(.))(l_L(.))[(_)i1Ja2








Asdiscussed above, it can be seen from expression (10) that the
worker's compensating differential will be larger as the share ofunpre-
dictable wage variation in total wage variation is larger (a larger),
and as the worker's marginal utility of wealth is more rapidly
diminishing (aA larger negative). The compensating differential
will be smaller as the worker is more able to substitute leisure across
periods (S11 larger negative).
B. The Worker's Opportunity Set for Combinations of_Mean and
Variance in Hourly Wages
Across individuals, one might expect to find considerable
variety in tastes for wage variation. In terms of our theoretical—12—
model, the indirect utility function V(.) mightdifferfrom person
to person, or the relative shares of and a2 In total wage
variation might differ from person to person. At the same time,
profit—maximizating firms, because of the nature of their tech-
nologies, might find it in their Interests to offer employees dif-
ferent combinations of ianda• Using Rosen's [1974] terminology,
In equilibrium, workers and firms are perfectly matched when their
respective "offer" and "value" functions for variability and return
are tangent, and the value of the tangent gives the implicit price of
variability in terms of expected return. The joint envelope of all
offer and value functions comprises a "market locus", which shows how
the market will permit workers and employers to substitute variability
and return.
Of course, wage variation is not the only important job
attribute. Presumably, individuals and firms are matched on the basis
of a large number of individual and firm—specific characteristics.
Denoting these other characteristics by the vector Z, the constraint
facing the worker In his choice of a specific combination of mean and
variance in the hourly wage can be summarized by the market locus,
(11) p= f(a2,Z).
It is important to emphasize that we assume equation (11) to be
generated by the optimizing behavior of firms and workers. The rela-
tionship between the level of wages (or earnings) and its variance has
been studied in a number of quite different contexts. For example,—13—
simple mathematical models in which income at any time is modelled as a
sum of random shocks from previous periods yield predictions on the
mean—variance relationship in income, and similar arguments could be
applied to wages.5 Obviously, any observed empirical relationship can
be consistent with a large number of interpretations, and we have found
no way to "prove' that ours is better than such a mechanistic point of
view. We merely note that an equilibrium interpretation is in the
spirit of much other theoretical and empirical work on labor markets.
(See for example, C. Brown [1980].)
Theory provides few clues as to the functional form of the
market locus given by (11). In part, this indeterminacy results from
the ambiguity involved in characterizing the individual worker'spre-
ferences for mean and variance in the hourly wage. In addition, the
presence of heterogeneous tastes and technologies in the market rein-
forces this indeterminacy. At this very general level, aside from the
existence of some equilibrium relation such as (11), theory provides
little structure for data analysis.
C. The Worker's Optimal Job Choice
Utility maximization requires that the 'worker equate his margi-
nal rate of substitution between i' and a2 to the marginal rate of
transformation implicit in the set of wages for jobs among which he
5See Mincer [19701 for a critical discussion ofsuch models.—14—
can choose. More explicitly the worker's optimal choice of a job is
characterized by the following equality:
di _df(.)
da
W dE0V(.) = 0 W
where f(s) is given by (11). Given the theoretical ambiguities dis-
cussed above, condition (12) yields no unambiguous comparative
statics results. As a basis for estimation of worker preferences,
however, it can be of value. Coupled with the hypothesis of un-
changing preferences and augmented by empirical information, moreover,
condition (12) can serve as a basis for the prediction of worker be-
havior. The following section exploits this fact by stating equation
(12) in a specific form suitable both for the estimation of worker
preferences and the subsequent prediction of worker behavior.
III. Empirical Specification
Empirical implementation of equation (12) requires a specific
functional form. Consider first the right—hand—side of (12), which is
derived from (11). The first issue in specifying (11) is the selec-
tion of the variables in the vector Z. As noted above, jobs are
characterized by a large number of attributes.6 We make no attempt
to include all possible attributes. Instead, we consider only two,
education (ED) and years of experience (EXP), which have been shown in
Brown [19801 discusses a number of possibilities.—15—
other studies to be important.
With respect to the form of f(), we note that deriving a
closed form expression for the market locus on the basis of under-
lying utility and production functions is virtually an intractable
problem. (This point has been emphasized by Rosen [1974].) In our
view, the most sensible approach is to choose a convenient functional
form that fits the data fairly well. We have selected the commonly used
semilogarithmic specification
(13) in k =+*1EDk + *2"k + *3"k + *4k +
where the subscript k indexes individuals.7 (For simplicity we
suppress the w subscript on o In equation (13) and hereafter.)
If the usual additive error term is appended to (13), then it
can be estimated by ordinary least squares.8 Note that although the
are identical across individuals, the implied values of
a
dependupon levels of 1'k and ak, and hence vary from person to
person.
7Several other functional forms were examined, including some which
allowed for Interaction among the right hand side variables. The
substantive Implications of these other functional forms were not
much different from those of (13). These results are reported in
the Appendix.
8Although the individual chooses p andjointly, ordinary least
squares estimation of (13) is nevertheless appropriate within a
single market, if within such a market all participants face the
same market locus. In contrast, going across markets, differen-
ces In opportunity sets may lead to wealth effects on choice
that require simultaneous equations methods in the estimation of
(13).—16—
We turn next to the parameterization of preferences. In
keeping with the earlier theoretical treatment of the worker's pre-
ferences for mean and variation in hourly wages, we seek a specifica-
tion that does not constrain the sign of the worker's marginal rate of
substitution between k and It would also be desirable if the
specification did not constrain the relation between this marginal
rate of substitution and the overall level of wealth (as measured by
Nor should the specification predetermine the effect of a tax
change upon the pre—tax mean and variation of the wage.9 At the
same time, however, the chosen specification should economize on the
number of parameters to be estimated and should provide a convenient
basis for subsequent prediction. We assume that the indirect utility






where k is a parameter that varies across individuals, and is
one minus the kth worker's marginal tax rate." If we approximate
this function by a second order Taylor series and then take the
9As is well—known from the literature on taxation and portfolio be-
havior, a tax can either increase or decrease the equilIbrium
variability of a portfolio. See Feldstein [1969]. Similar con-
siderations apply here.
10This is the distribution function of the Weibull distribution. See
Mood, Graybill and Boes [1974, p. 542].
''For simplicity, we assume the worker's marginal tax rate to be
Independent of the worker's wage in period I •Weinterpret
as Incorporating the Individual worker's values of A and r—17—





Estimates of the market locus (13) together with the first—
order condition (12) and slope of the indifferencecurve (14) enable
us to compute a value of 8i for each nd1v1dua1. From the market
locus, we know that for the kth individual, the marginal trade—off




By the first—order condition, expression (15) must equal the value of
expression (14) for the kth individual:
_____ 1 Bkl 1 (16)
2k(*4+2*5ak =--[8(Ou) + (18k)(ekpk) 1
Equation(16) does not yield a closed form expression for8k' but a
solution can be found using numerical methods. Note thatequation
(16) allows the calculation of a unique k for each Individual in the
sample. Unlike previous studies in this area (e.g., Weiss [1972]),
heterogeneity in tastes Is allowed.
Using these estimates of k in conjunction with the opportunity
locus parameters, we can estimate each individual'sresponse to a—18—
hypothetical change in the tax rate faced by that individual.
Specifically given and ek,(13)and (16) can be regarded as two
equations in the two unknowns and ak. Consider now a case In
which the tax rate of only the mth individual changes. In general,
when 0 changes, new values for pand aare required to solve the m ni m
equations. The solution to this simultaneous non—linear system can be
found using numerical methods. In this way, we obtain predictions of
how variance and return combinations for this Individual would change
If his tax rate were modified.
In the same way, we can repeat the exercise for each mdlvi—
dual, computing how his U*K and ak would change if he alone were to
face a change in his existing 0k •Belowwe report the sample aver-
ages of the changes so generated.
It is tempting to use these sample averages to predict the
aggregate response that might follow from a change in tax rates for
all workers. However, if every worker's tax rate were simultaneously
modified, the market locus itself would shift, leading to a further
readjustment not captured by the sample averages reported here. Only
if firms were homogenous could these sample averages be used topre-
dict aggregate responses to general changes in tax rates. In this
case the market locus would coincide with the firm's value functions
and, because the locus would depend only on firms' preferences, any
change in exogeneous factors influencing workers' opportunity sets
(for example, tax rates) would leave the market locus unchanged and
would cause workers merely to relocate along this fixed locus. A more—19—
general analysis would allow for a "supply response" that would shift
the locus, but this is beyond our scope.'2
In addition to calculating how taxes modify workers' selections
of k and k' jwouldbe useful to obtain some measure of the impact of
tax changes on welfare. Looking at the differences between mean wages
under alternative tax regimes is not enough, because the variability
of wages also changes. A natural way to take both the mean and
variance of wages associated with a given tax system into account Is
provided by the compensating differentials previously estimated.
Specifically, within our framework, the expected utility for
the kth worker associated with any job can be approximated by the
linear function
22
(17) EOVk(•) +10k'k+ n2ekJk.
where the 's are parameters. A change in expected utility is given
by
(18)Eovk(s) 1°k'k+ n2A(ekak).
Neither nor can be observed directly, so the actual
effects on expected utility cannot be directly calculated. Neverthe—
less, a close alternative is possible. On the basis of equation (17),
expected utility on any job can be converted into monetary units by
dividing by
'21n the literature using cross—sectional data to estimate the
elasticity of hours of work with respect to the post—tax wage, it
Is typically (Implicitly) assumed that the structure of before—tax
wages Is invariant with respect to the tax change. The assumption
of a fixed locus Is our analogue to this standard assumption.—20—
(19) E V(•) + 0k'k + -'---(Oa).
Equation (19) gives the approximate monetary value of the expected
utility on any job for any particular individual. (Recall that
is "like" dV/d.) From (19), it follows that for a discrete change
2 in k and
E0V (.) 22
(20)
Thus, given 21 ,theeffect of any change on the monetary value of
expected utility for any individual can be calculated. Moreover,
unlike or taken separately, the ratio is observable
——itis just the compensating variation in k that would leave the
individual's utility unchanged in the face of a marginal increase in
a. As indicated by equation (14), this compensating variation is
1 given by —[Bk(OkPk) + (1_k)(Okiik) ].Substitutingthis
expression into (20), we find









Because our framework requires the computation ofianda2
f or each worker, data that record individuals'wage rates over time
are required. We use data from the Panel Study of IncomeDynamics for
the years 1970 to 1976. Given that the modelassumes individuals to
choose lifetime jobs, we restrict our sample only to thoseindivi-
duals who do not change jobs during the sampleperiod. As Hall [1982]
has noted, lifetime jobs are indeed quite important in theU.S. eco—
nomy. We include only white males in order to avoid possible compli—
cations that might arise because of labor market discriminationand
anticipated career interruptions. After deleting a few observations
due to unusable data, we were left with 728 observations.
The theory assumes that individuals respondonly to real magni-
tudes, so all wage rates were converted to 1970 levels bydeflating
with the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer's Price Index(all
Items). The period—zero expected wage for each individual,k was
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the individual'swage rates over
the seven—year period. The mean value ofUk in our sample was $4.77.
The variable was calculated as the sample variance of the
wage.1-3 Its average value was $0.59. The other variablesrequired
13We emphasize again thatour focus is on "variation" of the hourly
wage, rather than Its "risk" or "uncertainty". Nore elaborate
methods for calculating the expectedwage and its dispersion could
have been used. Given the potential forinaccuracy in modelling
expectations, however, It seemed to us desirable to use the
simplest formulation possible.—22—
for estimation are education, experience and the marginal federal
income taxrate.These were measured by their 1976 values.14
B. Results
Our first step was to estimate the market locus. We estimated
the following relation:
(22) 'k= 4.638 + •O584EDk + .O371EXPk —.000S44EXPk+ .OO476ak —8.19x106ak
(0.74) (.00359) (.00495) (9.42x105) (4.81x104) (1.69x106)
R2 =0.55,
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The coefficients
on education, experience and experience squared are similar in magnitude
to those that have been found in other studies. The coefficient on the
linear term in a is positive and that on the quadratic term is negative.
At low levels of k increases as increases, but at high
levels it decreases.15 Evaluated at the means, the elasticity of 'j
withrespect to a is .23.
The model developed in Section II highlighted the theoretical in-
determinacy of the effect of upon In our empirical work, we
14th our sample, themean value for ED is 12.2 (std.dev.=3.01); for
EXP, 26.2 (std.dev.=9.54); and for the marginal Federal income tax
rate, 0.26 (std.dev.=0.0713).
'5As mentioned above, we experimented with several functional forms.
These results, which are reported in the Appendix, indicate that
the implied values of k'k are not very sensitive to changes
in functional form.—23—
find that the quadratic term in (22) does not dominate until takes
on a value of $2.90, and in our sample, there are only a few obser—
vations for which exceeds this value. Thus, we now see that for
most of the people In our sample, increases In a require a compen-
sating increase in p. The "positive" effect of wage variation asso-
ciated with inter—temporal substitutability is outweighed by the
"negative" effect associated with risk aversion. This result Is con-
sistent with recent research on Intertemporal labor supply, which
suggests that Intertemporal substitutIon elasticities are indeed quite
small. (See, e.g. MaCurdy [1981].)
With equation (22) in hand, k/ak can be computed for each
individual, Substituting this and the individual's value of Into
the first—order condition (16), we can calculate ak for each indivi-
dual. The average value of in our sample was 0.541, with a sample
standard deviation of 0.105. The relatively large standard deviat±on
suggests considerable heterogeneity of tastes, a phenomenon that has
also been noted In studies of other types of labor supply decisions
(see Heckman and Willis [1977]).
Finally, with estimates of k' we can predict howak, k' and
the money—equivalent value of the Individual's bundle would change
under alternative tax regimes. To Illustrate, we consider a case in
which each individual's tax rate is reduced by one—third, and use
equations (13) and (16) to find the new equilibrium values of
and ak .Wethen substitute these Into equation (21) to find
the money—equivalent value of the change in utility.—24—
In a second simulation, we compute the individual's new equilibria
when the tax is removed altogether, 0 =1.The results of this second
exercise must be regarded with particular caution, however, because
our parameter estimates are probably more reliable for analyzing local
than global changes.
The first entry in row 1 of Table I shows the average expected
pre—tax marginal wage (ilk) under the status quo, the second when the
tax rate is reduced by one—third, and the third when the tax rate Is
zero. The second row gives the same Information for the temporal
standard deviation of the wage. Our estimates Indicate that to
a first approximation, if tax rates were cut by one—third, the
average pre—tax wage would increase by about 1.2%, and its variability
16
(measured by the standard deviation) would increase by about 5.0%.
Removing taxes altogether would increase the pre—tax wage and its
standard deviation by approximately 3.3% and 15.2% respectively.
The third row of the table shows the average change in the ex-
pected marginal after—tax wage (0kilk) under the alternative regimes
As noted above, this measure Is likely to misrepresent the welfare
effect of a tax change, because it does not take into account that the
variability ofthe wage stream changes as well. To the extent that
individuals are averse to variability, the difference in net wages
overstates the welfare change, and vice versa. In row 4, we report
16
As emphasized above, it should be kept in mind that these implica-
tions are only approximate, for they Ignore any changes in the






Status Quo One—Third Zero
(1) p $4.77 $4.83 $4.93
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054)
(2) a $0.59 $0.62 $0.68
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020)





*Numbersin parentheses are standard errors of the means. Variables
are defined in the text.—26—
the approximate monetary equivalent of the utility change, which takes-
into account both changes in the mean wage and its variability.
This is —-E0V(.)),as defined by equation (21).
When taxes are lowered by one—third, the combined effect of the
higher pre—tax wage and the lower tax rate is to raise the average ex—
pected net wage by $0.46. The result in row 4 indicates that taking
the concomitant increase in wage variability into account lowers the
monetary equivalent value of the change to $0.36. Similarly, the
change in the net wage induced by setting tax rates equal to zero,
$1.41, exceeds the monetary equivalent value of $1.04
We conclude that in the long run, tax reductions would induce
increases in both pre— and post—tax wage rates. However, due to
simultaneous increases in the variability of wages, measuring the
welfare effects by merely comparing changes in net wages would
substantially overestimate the welfare gain to Individuals.
V. Conclusions
We have examined how taxes affect the trade—off between the ex-
pected level of the wage and its variance. The data we examine
indicate that reductions In tax rates would lead to a substantial
Increase In the level and variability of people's pre—tax wages.
Given the absence of any earlier analyses of this kind, it is dif-
ficult to say whether or not effects of the magnitude we have found
are "reasonable". To us, they seem well within the bounds of possibility—27—
A considerable amount of sensitivity analysis was done to
assure that our substantive results were not too dependent on par-
ticular choices of functional forms. Nevertheless, it may be the case
that generalizing the theoretical framework could change the outcome.
Several possibilities are worth pursuing:
1.In our model, the variability—return locus is invariant
with respect to changes in the tax rate. Although partial equilibrium
analysis of the relationship between taxes and risk—taking has a long
tradition (see Tobin [1958]), ideally one would want to analyze how
the locus itself would shift in response to changes in tax rates.
2. The analysis ignores the interaction between financial
portfolio and occupational decisions. It might be, for example, that
people can buy assets whose returns are negatively correlated with
17 their wages, and thereby hedge their risks.
3. The individual's decision is taken in isolation from'-the
labor supply behavior of other. family members. There is a substantial
literature suggesting that husbands' and wives' hours of work deci-
sions are made jointly. It would be interesting to examine whether or
not spouses choose "job portfolios" which allow family variability to
be diminished.
17Landskroner [19771 discusses the theoretical issuesthat surround
this problem.—28—
APPENDIX
Theorydoes not give much guidance with respect to the
appropriate functional form for the market locus. In this appendix,
we report two alternatives to the specification (13) described in
the text.
1. Instead of a quadratic in a, its logarithm Is entered:
ln p =4.1443+ 0.0566ED +0.0379EXP—0.000554EXP2+ 0.192 £n a
(0.082) (0.0037) (0.00497) (0.0000945) (0.0135)
R2 =0.55
The elasticity of p with respect to a is 0.192, a bit below the figure
of 0.23 generated by the equation in the text.
2. The level of the mean wage, rather than its logarithm, is
the dependent variable. Interactions between education and experience
are included to allow for non—linearities:
in p =172.16—27.91ED+ 1.75 ED2 + 9.77EXP —.230EXP2 +.583EXP.ED




The elasticity evaluated at the mean is 0.25—29—
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